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The World Bank estimates that Africa’s inadequate infrastructure decreases productivity by 
around 40 per cent every year and reduces national economic growth by 2 per cent annually. 
Such disadvantages hinder private sector investment, which is a key driver of job and wealth 
creation. Financing the development of infrastructure in an appropriate manner has been a 
leading topic in the continents development agenda. In order to remedy the infrastructure 
deficit problem, more and more African countries are increasing their public debts by 
borrowing in the international markets to finance their infrastructure deficits in the hope that 
it will ultimately spur economic growth and attract more investment. 
SSA’s access to the international markets has grown significantly, facilitated by easing 
global financial conditions. By end March 2014, 13 countries had issued international 
sovereign bonds, for reasons that include infrastructure building. The sub-Saharan Africa’s 
region’s access to international markets has come under much attention lately as debt levels 
are rising with fears that they may reach the unsustainable pre –HIPC levels.  For example, 
Zambia’s total debt burden stood at an unsustainably high USD5.4 billion in 2005 – 
equivalent to 74% of the country’s GDP and almost 208% of its foreign exchange earnings 
(IHS Global Insights, 2014). The attainment of debt relief under the IMF and World Bank’s 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in early 2006 dramatically decreased the country’s 
debt holdings to less than 25% of GDP. However, in the third quarter of 2012, the 
government issued its first Eurobond and raised debt capital of USD 750 million. This was 
followed by a USD 1 billion Eurobond issue in the second quarter of 2014 (IHS Global 
Insights, 2014) with the stated intention of using the funds for infrastructural development 
and maintenance. However, according to the latest IMF statement on Zambia released on 6 
June 2014, Zambia’s macroeconomic situation, though potentially promising, is in trouble 
and needs urgent fixing. It appears that the government of Zambia wants an IMF funding 
arrangement, possibly a bailout (Zambian Economist, 2014).   
In the face of mounting evidence that access to the international capital markets and rising 
public debt are more likely to have enhanced vulnerability than growth, this paper examines 
the determinants of economic growth in a panel of 15 countries. It examines the impact of 
external debt, total public debt and infrastructure expenditure on economic growth in the 
southern African region over a period of 10 years (between 2004 and 2014).  
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The findings suggest an inverse relationship between external debt and total public debt 
against economic growth. The findings also suggest that there is a positive relationship 
between infrastructure development and economic growth amongst the countries in the 
southern Africa region. These relationships were found to be insignificant, suggesting that 
other factors outside of the variables of infrastructure expenditure, external debt and total 
public debt are influencing economic growth (or slowdown) in the region. The paper also 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
According to the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) estimates, Africa’s total 
infrastructure financing needs amounted to $93 billion a year in 2008, with only $45 billion 
financed (Brixiovia et al, 2011). Even if problems such as inefficient management, poorly 
targeted subsidies or tariffs were eliminated, a $31 billion a year gap would remain. Closing 
it will require innovative financing resources (Brixiovia et al, 2011). In SADC, US$ 2.1 
billion annually for at least a decade is required to complete and maintain the infrastructure 
need (SADC Infrastructure Master Plan, 2012).  
 
The World Bank estimates that Africa’s inadequate infrastructure decreases productivity by 
around 40 per cent every year and reduces national economic growth by 2 per cent annually. 
Such disadvantages hinder private sector investment, which is a key driver of job and wealth 
creation. Foster and Briceno - Garmendia describe the main constraints to infrastructure 
development to include (1) deficiencies in planning, preparation, and procurement; (2) poor 
management of existing infrastructure assets; (3) barriers to a regional approach to 
infrastructure development relative to national projects, such as higher transaction costs, 
more complex risks, and the absence of cross border cooperation and harmonization of 
policies, and (4) the lack of political will.  
 
1.1 Context of the research area 
Financing the development of infrastructure in an appropriate manner has always been a 
leading topic in the continents development agenda. Traditionally, infrastructure projects in 
Africa have been financed by the public sector or international investors (Irwing and 
Manroth, 2009) or from donor funding. However, the fiscal space for domestic public sector 
sources of infrastructure financing is limited (Irwing and Manroth, 2009).  In 2009 Irwing 
and Manroth estimated that most governments in sub-Saharan Africa spend about 6-12 per 
cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) each year on infrastructure and also pointed out 
that that does not amount to much in absolute terms because the economies in question tend 
to be small and hence these annual expenditures pale in comparison with the amounts 
needed. In SADC, governments spent on average between 2004 and 2012, 3.1 – 13.4 per cent 
of their gross domestic product on infrastructure investment, with South Africa the largest 
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economy in the region spending on average 1.3 per cent of their gross domestic product on 
infrastructure over the same period (African Development Bank, 2013). 
In the past, Africa’s infrastructure needs were largely financed by aid however more recently 
there has been an increased pressure to move away from traditional sources of financing, 
such as donor funding, for a number of reasons. First, this aid is often tied to conditions that 
are not necessarily beneficial to the recipient country or aligned to the continents priorities.  
Second, funding has become unpredictable, especially in light of the global financial 
constraints. Even though disbursement of official development finance (ODF) towards 
Africa’s infrastructure has grown from US$7.3 billion in 2008 to US$ 10.1 billion in 2010 in 
real terms, year after year all rich nations have failed to reach their obligations of the 0.7 per 
cent of GDP target, with the amount of aid pledged trailing at around 0.2 to 0.4 per cent.  
Third, it has become really hard for most African countries to access concessional lending 
after their debts were relieved in the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) and the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) process.   
To remedy the infrastructure deficit problem, more and more African countries are increasing 
their public debts to finance the infrastructure deficit in the hope that it will ultimately spur 
economic growth and attract more investment. Increasingly governments are making use of 
the international capital markets to finance their development needs, as a result, sub- Saharan 




The international capital markets present a largely untapped pool of capital to boost the debt 
capacity available for infrastructure financing. Capital markets are a natural source of 
infrastructure finance in developed country markets such as the US, and more recently an 
increasing number of developing countries such as India have made use of them, providing 
longer term finance than traditional bank lending (Irving and Manroth, 2009).   
Access to international bond markets brings opportunities to investors and sub-Saharan 
African countries, but risks exist. Foreign investors can diversify their portfolios by 
                                               
1
 Low interest rates in advanced economies and low global risk aversion leading to portfolio reallocation in 
search of risk adjusted yields and diversification opportunities are facilitating access of sub-Saharan African 
countries to international capital markets.  
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increasing their exposure to Africa, even from a relatively low base; and sub-Saharan African 
sovereigns can broaden the investor base for their public debt instruments. For issuers, the 
first impact is to enhance the available fiscal financing envelope, including longer –term 
project financing. The process also brings financial innovation to the continent, such as 
infrastructure bonds to bond enhancements and guarantees for local currency bond market 
products. Local currency bond markets helps sub-Saharan African economies better shield 
consumption and investment spending from the impact of exogenous shocks. This said, the 
availability of debt instruments may also generate new macro financial and debt 
vulnerabilities that need to be monitored carefully, and may in some cases reduce access to 
concessional financing( IMF Regional Economic Outlook, 2013).  
1.2 Statement of the problem 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s access to the international markets for borrowings for infrastructure 
needs has come under much attention lately. By end March 2014, a diverse array of 13 
countries in the region had issued international sovereign bonds, for reasons that include 
infrastructure building, benchmarking, and debt restructuring. According to the IMF, 3 
countries in SSA have issued bonds with the stated intention to use the money raised for 
building public infrastructure. In 2007, Ghana issued bonds to fund several projects, mainly 
energy and road projects. In 2012, Zambia issued sovereign bonds also to fund several 
projects in the energy and transport sector.  
It is no secret that sovereign bonds carry significantly higher borrowing costs than 
concessional debt does. So why now the rush to borrow on the international markets? 
Firstly investors who have put their money in the continent have realized the regions high 
return potential. The high return potential is owed to the natural wealth and improved 
macroeconomic policies and development potential (Stiglitz, 2013). With the exception of 
South Africa, the African continent has long been neglected by global financial markets, 
largely due to perceived political risk, and weak economic performance. However, during the 
past decade, Africa has made substantial progress in improving political and economic 
governance. Collectively the countries in the continent now boast robust average GDP 
growth, low debt ratios (thanks to the debt relief from the HIPC Initiative and the MDRI), 
abundant natural and human resources, among other potentialities. These factors have led to 
a reassessment of Africa’s risk configuration by global investors and opinion makers in an 
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environment characterized by uncertainty (Stiglitz, 2013). Secondly, SSA governments have 
realized that the conditionality and close monitoring typically associated with the multilateral 
institutions make them less attractive sources of financing. What makes international markets 
so lucrative for the governments of today is that with the no emphasis of close monitoring of 
the usage of funds obtained from the international markets, it will be years before any 
problems manifest and, then, some future politician will have to resolve them (Stiglitz, 
2013). Who knows how much money raised by Zambia on the international markets really 
ended up being used to fund infrastructure?  
In the SADC region, Mozambique, DRC, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Madagascar are all 
countries that have benefited from the HIPC Initiative and MDRI debt relief process. They 
are also countries that have issued international bonds for various reasons mainly citing 
infrastructure finance. However, they have all been recently downgraded by the rating 
agencies because debt sustainability has become questionable and even though most of them 
are said to be the fastest growing economies in the SSA region ; many of the economies debt 
accumulation growth rate has been faster than the economic growth – posing a great cause 
for concern. Debt situations have worsened in some middle income countries and are now a 
factor constraining policy decisions.  For example, Mauritius and Seychelles have debt levels 
that exceed the IMF indicative threshold level, whereas the South African debt ratio has been 
gradually approaching the threshold level over the past four years. An examination by the 
IMF (in its Regional Economic Outlook in 2013) revealed that debt developments in Sub-
Saharan African countries indicate that (1) several countries have experienced significant 
increases in public sector debt levels since 2007; and (2) forward looking assessments by the 
IMF of debt sustainability suggest that the debt outlook is a concern in a number of countries, 
partly constraining fiscal policy space.  
What seems to be a big concern is how African governments seem to have forgotten the 
lessons learnt from the sovereign debt reforms of the 1980s and the liberalization of capital 
markets in the 1990s where (Gill and Pinto): 
- Growth prospects of countries were overestimated , leading to excessive borrowing 
- Access to debt led to procrastination by governments on necessary but difficult 
reforms 
- Debt was misused, either facilitating capital flight or being invested in bad projects 
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- Available market based debt instruments created a predisposition to crisis  
All the above mentioned factors depict what is happening in Africa today.  
 
1.3 Purpose of the Research  
 
Empirical studies of the importance of infrastructure as a source of growth gained 
prominence with the papers of Auschuer (1989a, 1989b), which were followed by a large 
body of econometric research. In fact, the concerns over the sustainability of public debt 
levels are grounded in both theory and empirics. However, very few studies have been done 
on the Sub-Saharan Africa region. The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the 
public debt incurred for infrastructure development does indeed spur economic growth. The 
research will focus on the countries in the southern Africa region and aim to assess the 
following:  
 Given the current and past macroeconomic outcomes (2004 -2014), is the public debt 
boosting economic growth? 
The following questions will assist in assessing the above:  
1. Is there a relationship between total public debt (external and / domestic debt) and 
GDP growth across all countries in the SADC region? 
2. Is this debt spurring development?  
3. Are tax bases growing fast enough to support the growth in the debt (external and 
total debt)? 
4. Is there a  relationship between infrastructure expenditure and debt in the SADC 
region 
5. Is there a relationship between infrastructure expenditure and growth in the SADC 
region? 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: 
  
The next chapter lays down the foundation of this research paper by reviewing the empirical 
literature on the relationship between public debt and economic growth as well as the 
relationship between infrastructure and economic growth. Chapter 3 outlines the research 
methodology and Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results of the research. It also provides 
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policy considerations and recommendations for countries in the southern Africa region. 























Chapter 2: Literature Review  
Many economists have tried to investigate the effect of external debt on economic growth. 
The researchers have used different data sets, methods and techniques to test the nature of the 
relationship between external debt; total public debt; and infrastructure development on 
economic growth. Some researchers concluded that a negative relationship between external 
debt and economic growth exists because of the inefficient allocation of resources. This 
chapter examines the literature on public debt and economic growth. It also examines the 
effect of infrastructure expenditure by governments on economic growth.  
2.1 Public debt and economic growth  
2.1.1 Is there a critical level of public debt such that over it, more public debt leads to 
lower growth, all else equal? 
The global financial crisis and the expansionary government reactions in many countries has 
revamped the attention of policy makers and academics on the growth effects of large public 
debts. Recent empirical studies have investigated the impact of public debt on growth in 
advanced countries however few have focused on developing countries or African 
economies.  
In 2010 Presbitero researched total public debt and growth in developing countries. He drew 
a study of a panel of low income and middle income countries over the period 1990-2007 and 
the results showed that public debt has a negative effect on output growth up to a threshold of 
90 percent of GDP, beyond which its effect becomes irrelevant.  
In 2012, Panizza and Presbitero explored whether there is a casual effect between public debt 
and economic growth.  The two authors researched whether high levels of public debt reduce 
economic growth. They concluded that even if public debt is effective in the short run , 
expansionary fiscal policies that increase the level of debt may reduce long-run growth, and 
thus partly (or fully) negate the positive effects of the fiscal stimulus. Their conclusions were 
in line with a growing empirical literature which shows that there is a negative correlation 
between public debt and economic growth in advanced and emerging economies, and find 
that this correlation becomes particularly strong when public debt approaches 100 percent of 
GDP. Their findings are consistent with the findings of Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010a, as well 
as Kumar and Woo, 2010; Checherota and Rother, 2010 and; Cecchetti et al 2011. 
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Panizza and Presbitero’s second part of their paper placed a huge focus on causation; arguing 
that correlation does not imply causation. The two economists speculated that the link 
between public debt and economic growth could be driven by the fact that it is low economic 
growth that leads to high levels of debt. However, they observed that the correlation between 
debt and growth could be due to a third factor that has a joint effect on these two variables.  
In 2012 Presbitero continued his research and considered the growing role of internal 
borrowing looking explicitly at the effect of total public debt on output growth. This 
particular paper focused on poor countries and used a large sample of low and middle income 
countries to estimate the partial correlation between initial total public debt and subsequent 
per capita GDP growth. He also took to uncover possible non-linearities in a multivariate 
setting by adopting different econometric techniques. Finally, he also investigated the 
presence of possible sources of heterogeneity in the growth effect of public debt. He assessed 
this by looking at the impact of public debt conditioned to a country’s policies and 
institutional quality. With respect to the latter point, he argued that there are sound reasons to 
expect debt overhang
2
 to be a binding constraint to investment and growth only in countries 
with sound macroeconomic policies and institutions while in countries with volatile policies 
and lousy institutions, the latter are likely to hamper GDP growth, not debt, whose effect is 
overshadowed and becomes statically irrelevant (Arslanalp and Henry, 2006; Presbitero, 
2008; Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz- Arranza, 2010; Arone and Presbitero, 2010).  
The evidence found in Presbitero’s paper complements the one introduced by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010b), Caner, Grennes and Koehler-Geib (2010) and Kumar and Woo (2010): 
while they show that a debt burden above 90 percent is likely to hinder growth in advanced 
countries, they also provide evidence that debt overhang in low and middle income countries 
                                               
2
 Debt overhang indicates a situation in which an organisations debt is so large that any earnings generated by 
new investment projects are entirely appropriated by existing debt holders, and hence even projects with a 
positive net present value cannot reduce the organisations stock of debt or increase the value of the 
organisations (Myers 1977). The concept of debt overhang migrated to the international finance literature in the 
mid-1980s, when the debt crisis motivated a series of influential papers by Krugman (1988, 1989) and Sachs 
(1989). These authors argued that, as sovereign governments service their debt by taxing firms and households, 
high levels of debt imply an increase in the private sectors expected tax burden. Debt overhang characterizes a 
situation in which this future debt is perceived to be so high that it acts as a disincentive to current investment, 




is a growth constraint also for lower levels of debt. This is consistent with the hypothesis of 
debt sustainability and debt management capacity increasing with income. The argument 
used by Presbitero follows the old notion that industrialised countries are better able to than 
developing countries to borrow and use domestic foreign financing in a productive way, 
without paying the costs in terms of disincentive to investment, capital flight, policy 
volatility and crowding out, which generally goes hand in hand with large debts. By contrast, 
in developing countries the negative consequences of debt overhang are likely to offset the 
possible benefits derived from the availability of additional resources. The main reason for 
this opposite result is related to poor economic management and bad institutions, consistent 
with evidence discussed in the paper showing that country specific factors affect the way in 
which debt affect the economy: as already shown with respect to external debt (Presbitero, 
2008; Cordella et al, 2010), also total public debt is a constraint for economic growth only in 
countries that lack sound institutions and stable macroeconomic policies. Thus, irrespective 
of the income level, poor institutions and policies are likely to be the first-order constraint to 
growth. Where and when the institutional framework is sound, public debt has real effects on 
the economy – at least above 77 percent, while the evidence discussed in the paper suggests 
that in developing countries, where institutions and macroeconomic policies are less strong, 
debt overhang is effective for an intermediate level of indebtedness. In addition, where debt 
is larger, macroeconomic policies are generally worse and more volatile and they 
overshadow the possible negative effects of debt on output growth, which become 
statistically not significant.  
Notwithstanding a widespread data limitation, some recent efforts in collecting comparable  
public debt figures makes it possible to try and uncover the growth effect of total public debt. 
Abbas and Christensen (2010) complement the vast literature on external debt and growth 
finding that , in a panel of low income countries and emerging markets the stock of domestic 
debt becomes too large (above 35 percent of bank deposits), its contribution to economic 
growth turns negative). Other than being statistically robust across different econometric 
specifications, the growth effect of public debt is economically relevant: a 10% increase in 
the debt to GDP ratio is associated with a reduction of 0.2 percentage points.  
Gill and Pinto examined the association of poor results in developing countries, and two 





 proponents argued that developing countries, especially those 
with a history of default and high inflation and weak fiscal and financial institutions, 
countries cannot handle debt without becoming vulnerable to a crisis once external (public 
plus private) debt crosses 15-25 percent of GDP—a threshold much lower than actual 
external debt levels for larger developing countries. As similar arguments would apply to 
public debt, the policy prescription would be to lower indebtedness. Therefore, if debt is a 
binding constraint the countries need to either run larger primary fiscal surpluses in the hope 





 proponents argue that it is not the fault of developing countries, but 
their inability to borrow long-term in their home currency in the external markets. This 
creates a currency mismatch which increases output volatility and vulnerability to crisis. This 
mismatch would typically lead to a big increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the event of a 
real exchange rate collapse. The proponents further argue that the inability to issue long-term 
debt in the home currency is unrelated to domestic policies and institutions; this missing 
market stems instead from capital market imperfections, network externalities and 
transactions costs (Gill and Pinto, 2005).  
 
Thirdly, in assessing the original sin hypothesis, Goldstein and Turner (2004) agree that 
currency mismatches pose a threat, but disagree that they are exogenous to a particular 
country situation and therefore require an international solution. Their solution is to improve 
domestic policies— such as adopting flexible exchange rates to create more awareness of 
exchange risk, and more prudent macroeconomic policies more generally—and strengthen 
financial institutions in order to improve domestic financial intermediation while enabling 
strict oversight and control of currency mismatches. There is no quick fix; a decade may be 
required to secure tangible and lasting improvements.  
 
Andros Kourtellos also came to the same conclusion as Presbitero. His findings suggest that 
once a rich set of alternative theories are considered, there is very little evidence for such 
                                               
3
 Refers to the inability of emerging markets to manage levels of external debt that under the same 
circumstances would be manageable for developed countries.  
4
 Refers to a situation in which most countries are not able to borrow in their domestic currency.  
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nonlinearities. Instead his findings suggested that the relationship between public debt and 
growth is mitigated crucially by the quality of a country’s institutions. When the country’s 
institutions are below a particular quality level, then more public debt leads to lower growth 
(all else equal). However, if a country’s institutions are of sufficiently high quality, then 
public debt is growth neutral. 
In terms of the empirical literature, a recent prominent study by Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010 
found that there is generally a weak relationship between government debt and economic 
growth for countries with debt below 90% of GDP. However, for countries with debt-to-GDP 
over 90%, debt can have adverse consequences on growth. Other studies have attempted to 
provide a formal test for the 90% threshold value of Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010. For example, 
Cecchetti et al., 2011b and Caner et al., 2010 employed the threshold regression of Hansen, 
2000 to estimate public debt thresholds. Cecchetti et al., 2011b studied the effects of public 
debt on growth using a new dataset on debt levels in 18 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010. 
Using threshold regression, they found that government debt is bad for growth when it is 
above the threshold value of 85% of GDP. Caner et al. (2010) using threshold regression 
methods on data for a larger set of countries for 1980–2008 find that a threshold of 77% 
public debt-to-GDP ratio is the critical level after which debt becomes damaging to growth. 
Relatedly, Minea and Parent (2012) employed the panel smooth threshold regression model 
of González et al. (2005) who found that there is a negative effect of public debt on growth 
when the level of debt is between 90% and 115% of GDP. However, according to Munnel, 
1992 the current work suffers from a number of conceptual and methodological issues 
highlighting that an important limitation of the recent work has been the failure to adequately 
account for heterogeneity in the effect of debt on growth, which may arise due to alternative 
growth theories. Specifically, researchers have been searching for threshold effects of public 
debt on growth when debt is above or below a particular public debt threshold value. The 
alternative that has been considered is simply that there is no nonlinearity in the effect of 
public debt on growth. However, these studies do not investigate other possible threshold 
variables beyond the debt-to-GDP ratio. Munnell 1992 argues that the effect of public debt 
on growth is not only characterized by excessive levels of debt but the first order constraint 
to growth – which is poor institutions. Their argument is well placed in the context of 





2.1.2 The effect of external debt on growth in developing countries – the debt overhang 
hypothesis  
 
The only explicit debt-growth theoretical link is that between external borrowing (public or 
private) and growth, the assumption being that if the marginal product of capital is higher 
than the world interest rate for developing countries, then such countries would benefit from 
external borrowing (Eaton (1993)). But even here, external debt helps to exploit the existing 
growth potential of the country; it does not enhance it (Gill and Pinto, 2005). Theoretically, 
therefore, the only guideline one finds is that the rate of return on spending should exceed the 
marginal cost of borrowing on the assumption that the debt is eventually repaid (Gill and 
Pinto, 2005). 
The theoretical literature on the relationship between external debt and economic growth has 
focused largely on the harmful effects of a country's "debt overhang"—the accumulation of a 
stock of debt so large as to threaten the country's ability to repay its past loans, which, in 
turn, scares off potential lenders and investors. That is, if a country's debt level is expected to 
exceed the country's repayment ability with some probability in the future, expected debt 
service is likely to be an increasing function of the country's output level. Thus, some of the 
returns from investing in the domestic economy are effectively "taxed away" by existing 
foreign creditors, and investment by domestic and foreign investors is discouraged. 
Debt overhang also depresses growth by increasing investors' uncertainty about actions the 
government might take to meet its onerous debt-servicing obligations. As the stock of public 
sector debt rises, investors may worry that the government will finance its debt-service 
obligations through distortionary measures, such as rapidly increasing the money supply 
(which causes inflation). Amid such uncertainty, wary would-be private investors tend to 
remain on the sidelines. And even when they do invest, they are more likely to opt for 
projects with quick returns rather than for projects that enhance growth on a sustainable basis 
over the long run. This is particularly true for African countries where the infrastructure 
investment is often related to the exploitation of a natural resource and it needs to be 
exported so the infrastructure is often not related to anything that will contribute to intra-
country trade or regional trade (usually its infrastructure leading to ports). 
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Moreover, debt overhang may also discourage efforts by the government to carry out 
structural and fiscal reforms that could strengthen the country's economic growth and fiscal 
position, because a government whose financial position is improving almost inevitably finds 
itself under increasing pressure to repay foreign creditors. This disincentive to reform would 
exist in any country with a heavy external debt burden, but it is of special concern in low-
income countries, where structural reforms are essential to sustain higher growth. 
Of course, not all foreign borrowing dampens investment and growth. At low levels of debt, 
additional foreign borrowing could stimulate growth, to the extent that the additional capital 
financed by this new borrowing enhances the country's productive capacity. Higher output, in 
turn, would make it easier for a country to service its debt. As debt and the capital stock 
increase, however, the marginal productivity of investment falls. Some analysts have argued 
that only above a certain threshold will additional foreign loans have a negative impact on 
growth, owing to the debt-overhang considerations explained above. That is, up to a certain 
threshold, increased borrowing makes repayment of debt more likely. But, beyond that 
threshold, further increases in foreign debt reduce the prospects of creditors being repaid. As 
a country's access to loans drops, its ability to accumulate capital suffers, and growth may 
slow. In short, the negative effects of debt overhang are likely to take effect only after a 
certain threshold level has been reached. 
The empirical literature has found mixed support for the debt-overhang hypothesis. Most 
models of the determinants of growth have presumed that the stock of debt affects growth 
both directly (by reducing a government's incentives to undertake structural reforms) and 
indirectly (by dampening investment). But relatively few studies have assessed the direct 
effects of the debt stock on investment in low-income countries econometrically. A 2001 
review of studies on the debt-overhang hypothesis by Geske Dijkstra and Niels Hermes 
found the empirical evidence on this issue to be inconclusive and few studies have been able 
to determine how large the stock of external debt has to be, relative to GDP, for the debt 
overhang to have an effect. 
A 2002 study of 93 developing countries between 1969 and 1998 by Pattillo et al found 
strong support for the debt-overhang hypothesis, however. The authors found that external 
debt began to have a negative impact on growth when its net present value exceeded 160–
170 percent of exports and 35–40 percent of GDP. Their simulations suggest that doubling 
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the average stock of external debt in these countries would slow down annual per capita 
growth by between a half and a full percentage point. 
In a follow-up study in 2004 by the IMF , Pattillo and her coauthors applied a growth-
accounting framework to a group of 61 developing countries over 1969–98 and found that 
doubling their average external debt level reduces growth of both per capita physical capital 
and total factor productivity by almost 1 percentage point. In other words, large debt stocks 
negatively affect growth by dampening both physical capital accumulation and total factor 
productivity growth. 
In theory, the service of external public debt (the payment of interest and repayment of 
principal which is to be distinguished from the stock of external debt, may also affect growth 
by discouraging private investment or altering the composition of public spending. Higher 
external interest payments can increase a country's budget deficit, thereby reducing public 
savings. This, in turn, may either drive up interest rates or crowd out the credit available for 
private investment, depressing economic growth. Larger debt-service payments can also 
inhibit growth by squeezing the public resources available for investment in infrastructure 
and human capital. Indeed, such nongovernmental organizations as Oxfam International see 
high external debt service as a key obstacle to meeting basic human needs in developing 
countries. But relatively few empirical studies have tested these hypotheses by assessing the 
effects of debt service payments on private investment or on the composition of public 
spending, and the available empirical evidence is mixed. 
Debt service, in contrast with the stock of debt, has no direct effect on growth, perhaps 
because its influence is realized through its impact on investment, which is also included as 
an explanatory variable in most growth models and is thus held constant. Gross investment 
has a significant positive impact on growth. Economists from the IMF have found that lagged 
GDP has a statistically significant negative impact. The central government's fiscal balance 
has a significant positive effect, consistent with recent research that found links between 
sound fiscal policy and economic growth, while population growth and terms of trade shocks 
are statistically significant and negative. Re-estimating the growth equations, but 
disaggregating gross investment into private and public investment, suggests that it is public 
investment that affects growth in low-income countries. For each percentage point of GDP 
increase in public investment, annual per capita growth rises by 0.2 percentage points. High 
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levels of public investment that increase budget deficits do not necessarily lead to faster 
growth, however, because larger budget deficits have a dampening effect on economic 
activity. In the re-estimated equations, changes in the terms of trade, population growth, and 
openness have no significant effect on growth. As before, debt service has no direct effect. 
With respect to the stock of debt, the results are once again consistent with the debt-overhang 
hypothesis—the marginal impact of external debt on growth becomes negative beyond a 
threshold ratio of debt-to-GDP of about 50 percent of GDP for the face value of debt and 20–
25 percent of GDP for the estimated net present value of debt. 
The results of the growth model used by Patillo show that: estimated results provide some 
support for the debt-overhang hypothesis and suggest a threshold of about 30–37 percent of 
GDP. Beyond that threshold, higher external debt is associated with lower growth rates for 
per capita income, independent of any effect debt may have on gross domestic investment. 
These findings imply a more powerful relationship between debt and growth in poor 
countries than researchers have found in developing countries generally. And the effect of 
debt on growth is greater when the effects of debt on public investment and the central 
government's fiscal balance, both of which influence growth, are taken into account. 
The stock of external debt has no significant effect on public investment; public investment 
seems to be driven more by the government's current fiscal position and the availability of 
resources than by factors that affect fiscal sustainability over the longer term. However, the 
results support the hypothesis that higher debt service (as opposed to the stock of external 
debt) crowds out public investment. The relationship is nonlinear, with the crowding-out 
effect intensifying as the ratio of debt service to GDP rises. On average, for every percentage 
point of GDP increase in debt service, public investment declines by about 0.2 percentage 
point of GDP. In some sense, the modest magnitude of this decline is surprising, indicating 
that large debt burdens have not seriously hampered public investment in low-income 
countries. More important, it implies that, all things being equal, debt relief by itself cannot 
be expected to lead to large increases in public investment. In most cases, debt relief leads 
either to greater public consumption or, if used to reduce government deficits or to lower 
taxes, to greater private consumption and investment. 
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If only a small share of debt relief is channeled into public investment, the corresponding 
impact on growth will also be modest. For example, according to economists Panizza and 
Presbitero a reduction in the ratio of debt service to GDP from 8.7 percent (the average in 
2000 of the seven most heavily indebted poor countries) to 3.0 percent (roughly the average 
debt service-to-GDP ratio for all highly indebted poor countries in 2002) would increase 
public investment by 0.7–0.8 percentage point of GDP and indirectly raise real per capita 
GDP growth by 0.1–0.2 percentage point annually. Still, this small boost to growth (in 
absolute terms) is roughly equal to the actual growth in per capita incomes achieved by 
heavily indebted poor countries during the 1990s. Moreover, if half (instead of a fifth) of this 
debt service relief were channeled to public investment, annual per capita growth would rise 
quite significantly (about 0.5 percentage point a year). Under all scenarios, the positive 
impact of greater public investment on growth will be offset, in part or in full, if financed 
through larger budget deficits. 
So in conclusion: although high levels of debt can depress economic growth in low-income 
countries, external debt slows growth only after its face value reaches a threshold level 
estimated to be about 50 percent of GDP (or, in net present value terms, 20–25 percent of 
GDP). 
2.2 Infrastructure and economic growth       
The relationship between infrastructure and economic growth is quite complex. Although 
infrastructure development is important and necessary for industrial take-off and economic 
growth, the desire for growth does not necessarily mean higher or increased need for 
infrastructure and more infrastructures does not necessarily guarantee more economic growth 
(Romp and de Haan, 2005). 
 
While pioneer efforts in the field suggest a positive relationship between infrastructure 
development and economic growth and report robust positive coefficients (Ratner, 1983; 
Auscher, 1989; Mitsui and Inoue, 1995), a sizable number of subsequent studies have 
reported less than attractive results, thus suggesting a weak link between infrastructure 





Aschauer (1989), investigated whether all government expenditures are productive using a 
production function in which output depended on public capital and employment. His result 
showed that the elasticity of output with respect to public capital was between 0.34 and 0.39. 
This result was interpreted to mean that the marginal productivity of public capital is 70 cents 
to a dollar. Other studies such as Eisner, (1991), Ford and Poret, (1991), Holtz-Eakin(1988); 
using macro time series approach all found evidence in support of Aschauer (1989). 
However, their results showed public capita elasticity of output significantly lower than 
Aschauer’s earlier claim. They all found that the marginal product of government capital 
higher than the marginal products of private capital. These findings somehow defy logical 
reasoning given the available data. The studies have been criticized based on a number of 
isssues which includes: their definition of government capital; their failure to recognize the 
time series properties of data used in the studies and the potency of the econometric method 
used in their analysis. Generally the stock of public capital used in the above studies is the 
addition of state and local capital stock which corresponds to the official figure in 
government publications. However, the official figure in government publication comprises 
some public capital components which have no direct bearings or connections to productivity 
or output levels (Gramlich, 1994).  
 
The enthusiasm among policymakers for the early Auschauer results was matched, if not 
surpassed, by skepticism for the part of many economists. Critics of these studies charged 
that the methodology was flawed, that the direction of causation between public investment 
and output growth was unclear and that, even if the historical empirical relationships were 
estimated correctly, they provide no clear indications for current policy (Munnell, 1992). So 
who’s right? What do we know and not know about the link between public infrastructure 
and productivity?  
 
Most economists agree that public capital investment can expand the productive capacity of 
an area, both by increasing resources and by enhancing the productivity of existing resources. 
For example, a well-constructed highway allows a truck driver to avoid circuitous back roads 
and to transport goods to market in less time. The reduction in required time means that the 
producer pays the driver lower wages and the truck experiences less wear and tear. Hence, 
public investment in a highway enables private companies to produce their products at lower 
total cost. The condition of the highway, of course, is just as important as its existence. 
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Similar stories can be told for mass transit, water and sewer systems, and other components 
of public capital. 
 
Beginning with Aschauer’s work, a number of studies have estimated regressions where the 
dependent variable is output within some area, and the independent variables are private 
capital, labour, public capital and a constant for the level of technology. In such regressions, 
the levels of public capital are generally significant, and the consensus is that Auschauer 
made a significant contribution by drawing attention to the importance of public 
infrastructure and by adding public capital to the conventional production function. The 
controversy arises about the method of estimating this expanded function and about the 
interpretation of the results.  
 
Public capital enhances the productivity of private capital, raising its rate of return and 
encouraging more investment. On the other hand, from the investors perspective, public 
capital acts as a substitute for private capital and ―crowds out‖ private investment. The 
estimated equations confirmed both forces but suggested that, on balance, public capital 
investment stimulates private investment.  
 
What we need to bear in mind is that the growth in the capital stock, whether private or 
public, in one year is to be correlated with the growth in output in that same year is not 
realistic. In fact, equations estimated in this form often yield implausible coefficients for 
labor and private capital as well as for public capital (Evans and Karras, 1991: Hulten and 
Schwab, 1991; Tatom, 1991).  
 
Capital investment, private as well as public, goes hand in hand with economic activity. 
However, this mutual influence can exist without necessarily tainting the coefficient on 
public capital, or, for that matter, private capital in estimated production functions.  
 
In 1996 Hulten investigated the relationship between infrastructure capital and economic 
growth. His paper showed that those low and middle income countries that use infrastructure 
inefficiently pay a growth penalty in the form of a much smaller benefit from infrastructure 
investments. The magnitude of this penalty is apparent when the growth experience of Africa 
is compared with that of East Asia: over one-quarter of the differential growth rate between 
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these two regions can be attributed to the difference in effective use of infrastructure 
resources. At the same time, the difference due to new public capital formation is negligible. 
 
Most contemporary explanations of economic growth assign a prominent role to capital 
formation. However, the relevant literature has focused primarily on investment in new 
capital, and comparatively little attention has been given to the effective use of capital stocks 
once the conditions responsible for economic backwardness may operate through the poor 
management of the means of production. If capital stocks are not used effectively, additional 
capital formation may be of little help in stimulating economic growth.  
 
Moreover, ―inadequate maintenance means that power systems in developing countries have 
only 60 percent of their generating capacity available at a given time, whereas best practice 
would achieve levels of 80 percent (and) water supply systems deliver an average of 70 
percent of their output to users, compared with best practice delivery rates of 85 percent‖. 
The World Development Report goes on to note that these deficiencies often arise from 
inadequate management of the existing infrastructure assets, as distinct from inadequate 
levels of new construction.  
 
The existence of an infrastructure effectiveness problem is well documented. What is not 
well known is the actual magnitude of the penalty that inefficiency imposes on economic 
growth. In addition, those countries that use infrastructure inefficiently pay a growth penalty 
in the form of a much smaller benefit from new infrastructure investments. This is the 
problem especially for African countries because maintenance of existing infratrsucture is 
often neglected. At the same time, the difference due to public capital formation is negligible. 
An even stronger impression is conveyed by the comparison of high and low growth rate 
economies. According to Hulten, more than 40% of the growth differential is due to the 
efficiency effect, making it the single most important explanatory of differential growth 
performance. However, the very strength of the efficiency effect invites the speculation that 
the infrastructure effectiveness variable is really a proxy for a more general productive 
efficiency. In this interpretation, it is the productivity with which all inputs are used that 
affects GDP growth rates, and not just the input of infrastructure. If this alternative 
interpretation is correct, it challenges the recent literature that suggests that differences in 
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total factor productivity are not of central importance in explaining the success of the East 
Asian economies.  
 
Thus economies that make less efficient use of their infrastructure capital are constrained to 
have lower level of real income per capita in the long run (all else equal). This is the penalty 
exacted by inefficiency. Thus, countries with different levels of infrastructure effectiveness 
will have different levels of income per capita, but the same steady-state rate of growth. 
 
In conclusion from the facts presented above, a key focus of the current literature on the 
effects of public debt on economic performance has been the attempt to identify nonlinear 
and in particular threshold effects. While many papers have found the debt threshold to be 
90% of GDP, the threshold for low and middle income countries is much lower at 35% 

















Chapter 3: Research Methodology  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodology that will be used to conduct this research paper.   
The economic theories presented in Chapter 2 suggest that if the borrowed money by a 
country is utilized in an effective and efficient manner for productive investment purposes 
then it can add value to the economic growth of that country. On the other hand large amount 
of external debt may cause a negative effect on the economic growth. This irony is explained 
by the debt overhang theory presented in Chapter 2 of this paper. When the accumulated debt 
amount crosses the threshold level of a country’s repayment capacity, the expected default 
may cause the domestic and foreign investors to draw back their money; this will negatively 
affect the economic growth of the country. This indicates that if the debt overhang is present 
then the future increase in the output are paid to the creditors in the form of debt servicing, 
the external debt play the role of tax on the future output.  
This paper is based on economic growth and its explanatory variables external debt; total 
public debt and infrastructure expenditure. The analysis done on the economic growth is 
based on the research done by the economists mentioned in Chapter 2 who were of the view 
that the debt burden of a country has a negative effect on the output produced. 
3.2 Quantitative Research  
The research will purely be of a quantitative nature, meaning that it will make use of 
numerical analysis in order to answer the research questions stated in Chapter 1 of this 
document.  
The greatest strength of quantitative research is that it produces quantifiable, reliable data 
that is usually generalizable to some larger population (Research Methods class notes, 2012). 
Quantitative analysis also allows researchers to test specific hypotheses, in contrast to 
qualitative research, which is more exploratory. However critics of quantitative research 
highlight the fact it decontextualizes human behavior in a way that removes the event from 
its real world setting and ignores the effects of variables that have not been included in the 
model (Research Methods class notes, 2012). 
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This study wishes to test whether public debt boosts economic growth in SADC. The 
hypothesis will therefore be broken down into public debt (external and domestic) and 
infrastructure expenditure to test the correlation between the factors. The following 
hypothesis will be tested across all countries in the SADC region: 
H1A: Total public debt (external and domestic debt) and economic growth is positively 
correlated 
H1B: External debt and economic growth is positively correlated 
H1C: Infrastructure expenditure and public debt is positively correlated 
H1D: Infrastructure expenditure and economic growth is positively correlated  
In this instance testing for a relationship between the different variables will require the use 
of an econometric model. Thus, a quantitative study not a qualitative study needs to be 
undertaken.  
3.3 Data collection 
Fifteen countries from the Southern Africa Development Africa (SADC) region have been 
chosen for the study. The analysis will cover years 2004 to 2014. The study concentrates on 
the effects of ―newly acquired government debt‖ that is often substantiated as addressing 
pressing infrastructure bottlenecks in the relevant countries.  
The data used for the study will be secondary data. Secondary data is data which already 
exists in processed form i.e. has been summarized and/or interpreted (Research Methods 
Class notes, 2012). The data will be obtained from the IMF Regional Economic Outlook 
2013 and the African Development Bank Statistics Department. The econometric software, 
STATA Command, will be used to handle the panel data.  
The following data will be collected per country in the SADC region to examine the above 
mentioned hypothesis: 
1. Infrastructure expenditure (by the government) 
2. Economic growth  
3. External debt  
4. Total public debt 
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All data will be measured as a percentage of GDP.  
3.4 Data Analysis 
In order to test the above relationships, the data will be organized into panel data. Panel data 
(also known as longitudinal or cross-sectional time series data) is a data set in which the 
behavior of entities are observed over time. These entities could be states, companies, 
individuals, countries etc. Panel data allows one to control for variables one cannot observe 
or measure like cultural factors or difference in business practices across companies; or 
variables that change over time but not across entities (i.e. national policies, federal 
regulations, international agreements etc). Thus it accounts for individual heterogeneity 
(Torres- Reyna, 2007).  
Torres- Reyna describes the several benefits from using panel data. These include the 
following:  
- Controlling for individual heterogeneity. Panel data suggests that individuals, firms, 
states or countries are heterogeneous. Time series and cross-section studies not 
controlling this heterogeneity run the risk of obtaining biased results 
- Panel data are better able to study the dynamics of adjustment. Cross-sectional 
distributions that look relatively stable hide a multitude of changes. Panels are also 
necessary for the estimation of inter-temporal relations, lifecycle and 
intergenerational models 
- Panel data are better able to identify and measure effects that are simply not 
detectable in pure cross-section or pure time series data.  
- Panel data models allow us to construct and test more complicated behavioural 
models than purely cross-section or time series data.  
 
Limitations of panel data include:  
One big disadvantage of using panel data is that conclusions based on simple linear 
regressions will not apply since individual specific characteristics are not taken care of. The 
usual macroeconomic conclusions are likely not to be confirmed due to interference of these 
characteristics that are attributable to individual country, firm or household. In other words, 
macro panels on countries or regions with long time series that do not account for cross-
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country dependence may lead to misleading inference (Torres – Reyna, 2007; Borenstein, 
Hedges, Higgins and Rothstein, 2009).  
Ultimately, panel data is not a panacea, however it will yield more powerful unit root tests 
than individual time series.  
3.5 Suitability of the model 
In reality different countries, households or firms are by their very nature different and any 
disparities of behaviour is likely to be systematic. To this end, therefore, there is a need to 
subject panel data to hypothesis testing to ensure we are going to deal with the right model.  
The Hausman test will be used to differentiate between the fixed effects model and random 
effects model in panel data. The fixed effects model assumes that there are unique attributes 
of entities (countries) that are not the results of random variation and do not vary across time.  
The Fixed Effects (FE) Model explores the relationship between predictor and outcome 
variables within an entity (country, person, company, etc.). Each entity has its own individual 
characteristics that may or may not influence the predictor variables (for example, being a 
male or female could influence the opinion toward certain issue; or the political system of  a 
particular country could have some effect on trade or GDP; or the business practices of a 
company may influence its stock price) Boresntein et al, 2009. 
When using the fixed effects model we assume that something within the individual may 
impact or bias the predictor or outcome variables and we need to control for this. This is the 
rationale behind the assumption of the correlation between entity’s error term and predictor 
variables. Fixed effects remove the effect of those time invariant characteristics so we can 
assess the net effect of the predictors on the outcome variable (Borenstein et al, 2009).  
Another important assumption of the fixed effects model is that those time-invariant 
characteristics are unique to the individual and should not be correlated with the others. If the 
error terms are correlated, then FE is not suitable since inferences may not be correct and you 
need to model that relationship (probably using random-effects), this is the main rationale for 
the Hausman test (Torres – Reyna, 2007).  
The random effects model assumes that there are unique, time constant attributes of 
individuals that are the results of random variation and so do not correlate with the individual 
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regresses. The rationale behind the random effects model is that, unlike the fixed effects 
model, the variation across entities is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the 
predictor or independent variables included in the model. It is used when there is belief that 
differences across entities have some influence on the dependent variable then the random 
effects model should be used (Torres – Reyna, 2007). 
An advantage of this model is that you can include time invariant variables (i.e. gender). In 
the fixed effects model these variables are absorbed by the intercept. 
Random effects assume that the entity’s error is not correlated with the predictors which 
allows for time invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables. In random effects 
one needs to specify those individual characteristics that may or may not influence the 
predictor variables. The problem with this is that some variables may not be available 
therefore leading to omitted variable bias in the model. Therefore RE allows to generalise the 
inferences beyond the sample used in the model.  
This model is adequate if we want to draw inferences about the whole population, not only 
the examined sample.  
The usual null hypothesis in testing for a suitable model is that the model to be estimated is a 
Random-Effects model. This is analogous to writing the maintained statement as: 
H0 : The differences in behaviour among the panels is not systematic. 
The opposing hypothesis is that the differences in panels are due to systematic differences 
among them.  
The actual testing procedure involves a test statistic called the Hausman Test statistic given 
as follows: 




b = Fixed-Effects regression coefficients 
B = Random-Effects regression coefficients 
V(b) = variance of b-coefficients 
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V(B) = variance of B-coefficients  
The hypothesis we are testing can be written in a different way as shown below: 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from Panel Estimation 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from Panel Estimation 
The calculated Hausman Test statistic follows a Chi- Square distribution with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of parameters in the model excluding the constant.   
Decision rule is reject H0 if the test statistic is greater than the critical value from the Chi-
Square distribution. In reality and for brevity, however, we conclude the decision on the 
hypothesis based on the probability value of the test statistic.  
When the probability value of the Hausman test statistic is less than five percent ( 5%) then 
we can reject the null hypothesis and make a conclusion that the differences in the panels is 
systematic and therefore a Fixed-Effect model is suitable for estimation.  
3.6 Model Testing Procedure to be followed: 
Step one: there is need to estimate the FE- model and store the results. Appropriate Stata 
commands are used to do this.  
Step two:  we estimate the RE – model and then 
Step three: We compute the test statistic and then compare it with the chi-square critical and 
the finally make a decision.  
Once the model has been chosen, the various relationship tests stated above will be 
conducted.  
3.7 Constraints of the research 
One of the criticisms of the recent work on the effects of public debt on growth is that the 
papers largely ignore the problem of endogeneity especially in addressing the threshold 
variable. The endogenous growth theory holds that economic growth is primarily the result of 
endogenous and not external forces. Endogenous growth theory holds that investment in 
human capital, innovation, and knowledge – based economy are significant contributors to 
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economic growth. The theory also focuses on positive externalities and spillover effects of a 
knowledge- based economy which will lead to economic development. The endogenous 
growth model also suggest that other factors besides just the debt-to-GDP ratio; e.g. a 
country’s trade openness or institutional quality contribute to economic growth. The 
endogenous growth models have been analysed by various authors in the economics 
literature. For example, Futigami et al. (2008) have studied an endogenous growth model 
productive public spending  and public debt but assumed that government debt must 
converge to a certain exogenously given debt too GDP ratio asymptotically. Kourtellos, 
Panizza and Greiner etc. have all used the endogenous growth model to determine the 
threshold level of debt. However, this thesis is not aimed at finding out the threshold level of 
debt in the SADC countries. The IMF Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) has already 
determined those thresholds for many African countries including those in the SADC region. 
The aim of the thesis is to determine whether public debt boosts economic growth in SADC 
by looking at various relationships listed above. Thus the thesis will exclude variables that 














Chapter 4: Presentation and discussion of results 
This chapter computes and presents the findings of the panel data analysis. It also presents 
suggestions for policy considerations by governments in the southern Africa region that are 
considering issuing or have issued sovereign bonds with the purpose of financing 
infrastructure.  
4.1 Model suitability using Panel Data collected from 15 African Countries 
Following the application of the procedure for testing model suitability outlined in Chapter 3 
the results below were obtained.  
The table below shows the results of the Hausman Specification Test. 
 
From the results table the probability value of the Hausman test statistic is greater than 5% 
and this means we fail to reject the Null Hypothesis that the difference in the coefficients is 
not systematic. 
Therefore the suitable model to use to estimate is the Random-Effects model. The 
implication of this is that there are no individual effects in the SADC countries. As stated in 
Chapter 3, the Random effects model assumes that the entity’s error term is not correlated 
with the predictors which allows for time invariant variables to play a role as explanatory 
variables. In the Random effects model the individual characteristics that may or may not 
influence the predictor variables need to be specified. The problem with this is that some of 
the variables may not be available therefore leading to omitted variable bias in the model. 
The biggest influence of the relationship between debt and economic growth in African 
Hausman Test of Independent Variables on Growth
---- Coefficients ----
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
Fixed Random Difference S.E.
IS (Infrastructure Spend)  .2051212 .2477809 -.0426597 .0765154
ExDebt (External Debt)  -.0100631    -.0114217        .0013585        .0192698  -.0114217  .0013585 .0192698
Debt (Total Debt)  .011371  .0081253 .0032457  .0214597
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
=        1.72
Prob>chi2 =      0.6331
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countries is the state of public institutions which is very hard to measure quantitatively and 
the data was unavailable for the countries under study. Thus this also presents a constraint to 
the research.  
4.2 Estimation of the Random –Effects GLS Regression Model for SADC countries 
The dependent variable is economic growth. The control variables are external debt 
(ExDebt), total debt (Debt) and infrastructure spending (IS). 
Dependent variable = Economic Growth (Growth) 
Table 2: Regression output for growth against Infrastructure spending (IS): 
 




Table 4: Regression output for growth against Debt (Total Debt) 
 
4.3 Interpretation of results 
Increasing infrastructure spending by one percentage points results in economic growth of 
0.229 units and increasing external debt and total debt by one percentage points results in a 
decline in economic growth of 0.014 units and 0.010 units respectively. This concludes that 
infrastructure spending has a positive effect on economic growth in the SADC countries and 
external debt and total debt have a negative effect on economic growth across the SADC 
countries. For all three variables the two tail p-values are greater than 0.05 meaning that the 
independent variables of infrastructure expenditure, external debt and total debt have an 
insignificant influence on the dependent variable economic growth. This means that 
economic growth is largely affected by factors outside this model. As pointed out earlier, this 
could largely be the result of weak public institutions that plague African countries. This 
finding is consistent with that of Andros Kourtellos who found that the relationship between 
public debt and growth is crucially affected by the quality of a country’s institutions. When a 
country’s institutions are below a particular level, then more public debt leads to lower 
growth (all else equal). However, if a country’s institutions are of sufficiently high quality, 
then public debt growth is neutral.  
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A good example of this is the debt of Japan which is 243.2% of GDP and the United States 
which is 104.5% of GDP including external debt (IMF, 2013). However, because the two 
countries public institutions are of sufficiently high quality and have debt management 
policies in place, the public debt effects against economic growth are neutral compared to the 
effects of public debt on growth in African countries.   
The results presented above are also consistent with the findings of researchers such as 
Atique and Malik, 2012, Presbitero, 2010 etc. who found that there was an inverse 
relationship between economic growth and external debt. Even more so the results are 
consistent with the results of Gill and Pinto who found that for developing countries external 
debt has a negative effect on economic growth at levels of about 15 – 25 percent of GDP 
instead of 90 percent as for developed countries. All countries under observation had external 
debt levels lower than 50 percent due to the debt relief initiative of the multilateral 
institutions. Yet, external debt had a negative effect on economic growth in the panel of 
countries under study.  
The results are also consistent with the findings of Hulten who found that infrastructure has a 
positive relationship with economic growth however low and middle income countries that 
use infrastructure inefficiently pay a growth penalty in the form of a much smaller benefit 
from infrastructure investment. The World Bank has noted that the deficiencies often arise 
from inadequate management of the existing infrastructure assets, as distinct from inadequate 
levels of the new construction. The existence of an infrastructure effectiveness problem is 
well documented, what is not well known is the actual magnitude of the pending inefficiency. 
Hulten, 1996 found that a one percent increase in the infrastructure effectiveness parameter is 
found to have an impact on growth that is more than seven times larger than the impact of the 
same percentage increase in the rate of public investment. In addition, these countries that 
use infrastructure inefficiently pay a growth penalty in the form of a much smaller benefit 
from new infrastructure investments. The magnitude of this penalty is apparent when the 
growth experience of Africa is compared with that of east Asia. Over one quarter of the 
differential growth rate between these two regions can be attributed to the difference in 
effective use of infrastructure resource. At the same time, the difference due to public capital 
formation is negligible. An even stronger impression is conveyed by the comparison of high 
and low growth rate economies (Hulten, 1996). Hulten also found that more than 40% of the 
growth differential is due to the efficiency effect, making it the single most important 
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explanatory of the differential growth performance. However, the very strength of the 
efficiency effect invites the speculation that the infrastructure effectiveness variable is really 
a proxy for more general productive efficiency. In this interpretation, it is the productivity 
with which all inputs are used that affects GDP growth rates, and not just the input of 
infrastructure (Gill and Pinto, 2005).  
So knowing that it is the inefficiency of public institutions that affect the economic growth of 
African countries more so than the infrastructure and public debt, the next phase of this 
chapter describes the risks and opportunities presented by issuing of international sovereign 
bonds for infrastructure investment.  
4.4 Conclusion and Policy considerations 
Issuing international sovereign bonds creates both opportunities and risks. These are, in 
principle, separate from those arising from changes in the level and composition of public 
debt, which reflect fiscal policy decisions and public debt management responses to the 
external environment. Countries may issue international sovereign bonds when public debt 
levels and ratios are falling, remaining unchanged, or increasing. They may issue foreign 
currency denominated sovereign bonds at the same time that authorities manage to reduce the 
currency risk in their overall debt portfolio. For example, countries may issue foreign 
currency-denominated sovereign bonds in smaller amounts than public foreign currency –
denominated external debt maturing in that year. This could result in a lower public debt 
level and lower foreign currency risk. 
 According to the IMF, the main opportunities that stem from issuing international sovereign 
bonds are: 
- International sovereign bond issuance can provide a benchmark for pricing corporate 
bonds in international markets, over time expanding the yield curve, and help increase 
access for the private sector and parastatal companies.  
- Accessing international markets through a sovereign bond can strengthen 
macroeconomic discipline and move forward transparency and structural reforms as a 
result of increased scrutiny by international market participants. For instance, 
Nigeria’s fiscal and monetary discipline to date has continued to strengthen following 
its increased presence in international markets in recent years 
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- At the current juncture of easy global financial conditions, issuing sovereign bonds 
could provide access to long term funding to help finance infrastructure, helping 
supplement low domestic rates in some countries. Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania and 
Zambia are examples of countries that tapped international capital markets with the 
stated objective of financing capital projects 
- Also, sovereign bond issuance can help lower debt servicing costs by substituting 
outstanding public external instruments (also denominated in foreign currency) 
contracted at higher interest rates with sovereign bonds with lower coupon rates, 
longer maturities, and no amortization for a significant time.  
Against these advantages, a number of potential risks are associated with access to additional 
finance, especially in the context of easy global liquidity. These risks include possible 
excessive fiscal expansion and public debt management problems that may impair 
macroeconomic stability (IMF, 2012). 
- Given limited administrative capacity, weak fiscal institutions, low efficiency of 
public investment expenditure, and governance issues prevailing in some of the sub-
Saharan African countries, there is a risk that increased public spending or investment 
projects financed by bond issuance may be poorly selected or executed and therefore 
would not render value for money. Increased public investment spending may also be 
accompanied by a rise in recurrent primary spending, which may be hard to reverse. 
- In terms of public debt management, it is possible that countries lengthen the maturity 
of public external debt and increase the share of public debt denominated in foreign 
currency. Although issuing sovereign bonds at low interest rates for longer maturities 
is generally advisable and could reduce rollover risks, countries need to factor in risks 
arising from changes in macro-financial environments over time. Bonds, in particular 
those with a bullet repayment structure, may have to be repaid at a time of higher 
interest rates, or when the currency may be weaker. Tapping international bond 
markets may also in some cases lead to reduced access to concessional financing. A 
strong public debt management office would help mitigate the risks associated with 
public external debt. 
- Although sovereign bond issues could help increase private sector and parastatal 
entities access to international capital markets, sometimes corporate governance 
structures and debt monitoring capacity may not be in place to contain 
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macroeconomic and structural vulnerabilities arising from increased private sector 
and parastatal external debt and currency risk exposure. Both the Asian crisis and the 
financial turmoil in Europe are reminders of the drawbacks of excessive private 
foreign debt. 
- Similar to other forms of capital flows, international bond financing has potential 
repercussions for the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policy. A shift to larger 
foreign financing potentially implies appreciation pressure for the domestic currency 
(depending on the import content of the associated spending). This may harm export 
competitiveness and if addressed via the issuance of sterilization bills, may cause an 
interest burden to the monetary authority or the treasury.  
The final choice needs to weigh advantages and disadvantages of alternative forms of 
financing in a country specific context. Capacity and financing constraints are a decisive a 
factor in determining how a country can use different financing options to reduce existing 
gaps, including in infrastructure.  From the standpoint of costs and risks, concessional 
financing remains the best option. However, as sub- Saharan African African countries are 
finding it increasingly harder to obtain concessional financing, they have to diversify their 
financing sources. In principle, in addition to the issuance of international bonds, there is a 
menu of financing options, including domestic bonds, syndicated loans, and public- private 
partnerships. In practice large projects will often be financed by a combination of available 
resources. Some countries in the region for example, Senegal have used and combine these 
options for infrastructure projects.  
Scaling up investment and the best financing venue should be seen as a joint decision. Policy 
makers will need to consider carefully the implementation capacity and the speed with the 
economy can absorb the desired ―scaling up‖ of infrastructure expenditure. Once a 
sustainable path has been determined, policy makers need to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of various financing options. They will therefore have to weigh carefully the 
issuance of bonds against alternative forms of more tailored financing, involving lower carry-
costs in case of bond proceeds cannot be allocated immediately to a specific high return use.  
The financial characteristics of the sovereign bond instruments could also contribute to 
mitigating the potential risks involved.  
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- Size of a bond should be carefully considered, based on its impact on the issuer’s debt 
profile. Accordingly, a prospective borrower needs to assess the impact of the new 
debt on debt sustainability and conduct a cost benefit analysis of the corresponding 
investment program. It should avoid exceeding funding needs to minimize carry-
costs, while being large enough to avoid an illiquidity premium. 
- Currency mismatches between the structure of government revenue and its overall 
public debt obligations should be mitigated to the extent possible. Debut issuers have 
generally denominated their bonds in the major reserve currencies, including the US 
dollar, euro, or yen. Although currency swap instruments may be used, US dollar 
instruments have denominated because they offer the deepest and most liquid 
markets. The possibility of issuing bonds in domestic currencies to tap international 
savings may be explored in some cases, and, in the savings may be explored in some 
cases, and in the longer term, a gradual program for local currency sovereign bond 
issuance could be planned. 
- Debt profile and structure of repayment. The bond maturity is an important 
consideration because, all other things remaining equal, a longer maturity would be 
lower rollover risks. Debut issuers may in some cases prefer short maturities; 
allowing time to showcase a strong performance lowering spreads. Meanwhile a short 
maturity may increase rollover risks. The type of bond (bullet, sinking, amortizing 
bond) is also critical in minimising rollover risk. The bullet structure is the most 
common traded), but may create bumps in the debt service profile. An amortizing 
bond would instead smooth the debt-service profile in the countries with higher 
public debt levels and more consolidated market presence. A bullet repayment 
combined with sinking fund whereby the issuing country sets up a fund that is 
gradually built to reduce the rollover risk at maturity provides a midway approach.  
- Legal terms and information disclosure. The prospective issuer needs to prepare well 
ahead. It should set up the legal framework and institutional capacity needed to 
support, monitor, and service international bonds. It should carefully consider, with 
the help of legal and financial advisors, the terms of the new bonds, most importantly 
the law that will govern these instruments and the market in which they are to be 
issued. The issuer may choose to issue a global bond and/ or exotic bond, and select 
the modalities of the issuance (public offering versus private placement). In this 
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context, the issuer should keep in mind that different costs and requirements 
regarding information disclosure and transparency to potential investors.  
Sound public debt management strategy and asset management capabilities are crucial for the 
success of a bond issuance. From a debt management perspective, the advisability of an 
international bond issuance should be assessed within the country’s medium term debt 
strategy framework. This would entail an evaluation of the implications for the country’s 
debt structure, management, and sustainability. In particular, the size and terms of a bond 
issue should be consistent with the country’s medium term fiscal policy objectives. Also, 
developing in-house human capacity (including investor-relations progrms) may help reduce 
funding costs and monitor price signals from secondary market transactions. An in-house 
capacity may be useful over time to assess proper levels of interest rates, in addition to the 
advice of investment advisors assisting with the issuance. Asset management capacity may 
become particularly useful when the amount borrowed exceeds the immediate financial 
needs.  
The International Monetary Fund has made the following recommendations for sub-Saharan 
Africa sovereign issuers: 
- Develop a sound macroeconomic framework and strive to maintain prudent fiscal 
policies that safeguard fiscal and public debt sustainability 
- Improve the composition and profile of public debt under an appropriate medium 
term debt management strategy 
- Adhere to best practices in terms of information disclosure and outreach to potential 
investors.  
- Lock in low interest rates with modest amortisation over long maturities, while 
smoothing the maturity profile of the entire public debt portfolio to minimize rollover 
risks. 
- Internalise the risks from uncertain future global conditions, which may make it more 
difficult to access markets and rollover debt 
- Review their capacity and secure appropriate technical assistance to prepare for 
issuing international sovereign bonds. 
Finally, a sovereign bond issue may not in all cases be the best financing option. Countries 
need to carefully consider alternative options to fund public infrastructure projects; in many 
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cases, more tailored financing options can either be less expensive or less risky. For example, 
bond financing may not be efficient if it is not possible to mitigate carry-costs by matching 
the funding requirements of the project over time through consecutive bond issues.  
Countries considering issuing international sovereign bonds should review capacity needs 
and secure appropriate technical assistance and training. Specific capacity building needs 
could include the following areas: (1) building macroeconomic frameworks reflecting the 
dimensions of the new bond issues- for instance, reserve adequacy exercises could help 
prevent debt-servicing problems and help identify carry-costs (ii) implementing improved 
prudential frameworks to monitor all relevant risks, currency mismatch, liquidity and interest 
rate risk) may increase the capacity of the banking system to intermediate the inflows 
effectively; and (iii) formulating and implementing a medium term debt strategy consistent 
with preserving debt sustainability and strengthening debt management and monitoring 
capacity. As part of a medium term debt framework, strengthening project evaluation 
capacity would generally also be necessary. 
The African Development Bank has made the following recommendations for financing 
Africa’s infrastructure with less impact on the debt sustainability: 
1. Tapping reserves in ―excess-savings‖ countries  
2. Establishing sovereign wealth funds 
3. Establishing Public Private Partnerships  









Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Without a doubt sovereign debt can help developing countries. It can enable governments to 
facilitate growth take-offs by investing in a critical mass of infrastructure projects and in the 
social sectors when taxation capacity is limited, or when the alternative would be to print 
money and compromise macroeconomic stability. Debt also facilitates tax smoothing and 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies, essential for reducing output volatility; and it permits an 
equitable alignment of benefits and costs of long-gestation projects by shifting taxation away 
from current generations. Sovereign debt can also facilitate the achievement of growth, for 
example, by enabling the optimal social provision of public goods such as education and 
infrastructure when taxation capacity is limited today but expected to be higher in the future. 
It also helps when public investments spur private investment through complementarities. 
But this critically assumes that only those public projects with economic returns exceeding 
the cost of borrowing are selected; and that the government subsidizes such projects when 
their financial return is lower than the cost of funds through redistributive taxation (as 
opposed to further borrowing): in other words, that governments play their assigned role (Gill 
and Pinto, 2005). 
 
The IMF highlights three reasons that explain why public debt may be better than taxation: 
1. Tilting – allowing a more equitable manner in which a country can exploit investment 
opportunities with long gestation periods. In a growing economy, it would be 
inequitable to tax current (poorer) generations to pay for investments that will benefit 
future (richer) generations. The only problem with this is that African countries 
sovereign bonds periods are too small and rarely span over 10 years, increasing the 
debt servicing burden of the government 
2. Smoothing – allowing a more efficient manner for conducting counter-cyclical 
policies or meeting emergency spending needs. Raising and lowering taxes frequently 
may entail efficiency losses and generate economic uncertainty.  
3. Stability – excessive reliance on printing money could lead to high and volatile 





This is what theory tells us. And there is every reason to believe that governments which 
borrow and spend prudently will reap these benefits in practice. But we also know that there 
has been a profusion of costly macroeconomic crises during the 1990s with public debt being 
a central cause e.g. Russia 1998 and Argentina 2001, or else absorbing the brunt of the 
impact e.g. Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand during 1997 -98. And the external debt 
crisis of the 1980s and the now controversial financial liberalization of the early 1990s have 
raised serious questions about the benefits of market based external finance for developing 
countries with access to the international capital markets (Gill and Pinto, 2005).  History has 
also taught us that unsustainable debt levels can lower growth by raising real interest rates 
and crowding out the private sector. Debt has eventually to be repaid- borrowing is simply 
postponed taxation. Hence, the use to which funds are put and the returns relative to the cost 
of borrowing become crucial (Gill and Pinto, 2005).  
The thesis set out to answer the following questions: 
Is there a relationship between total public debt (external and / domestic debt) and 
GDP growth across all countries in the SADC region? 
Yes, from the workings in Chapter 4 we can see that there is a positive correlation between 
infrastructure investment and a negative correlation between total public debt and external 
debt against economic growth. However, all these relationships were weak. This could reflect 
a number of factors, such as business cycle considerations (for example, lower revenue from 
subdued domestic activity could lead to delays in implementing projects), or capacity 
constraints. That said, it suggests the impact of possible time lags between bond issuance and 
putting the proceeds into actual use. This also highlights the issue of fungibility of funds as 
the proceeds of additional debt may be used for other budgetary purposes. Of all the 
countries that issued sovereign bonds in SADC for the purpose of infrastructure development 
e.g. Zambia and Tanzania investment in public infrastructure did not increase substantially 
afterwards. Instead investment in public infrastructure as a percentage of GDP in Zambia 
decreased afterwards.  
As discussed in Chapter 4 above, omitted variables can also be an explanation, e.g. a supply 
shock could both lead to lower growth and a higher public debt-to-GDP ratio. And weak 
institutions could likewise lead to low growth and high indebtedness. 
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Is the debt spurring development or a desirable level of economic growth?  
From the panel data analysis, it seems unlikely that the debt is spurring development (if it is 
then the impact is really minimal) as the public institutions lack debt management policies 
and lack policy certainty that affect foreign direct investment in the country.  
Are tax bases growing fast enough to support the growth in the debt (external and total 
debt)? 
No, over the period under review tax bases have grown on average 7% whilst total public 
debt has grown by 49% on average over the same period.  
The issue of causality remains. Does high public debt cause low growth, or is it a 
cumulative symptom of bad past decisions on spending and taxation, misuse of fiscal 
resources, poorly designed stabilization programs and the postponed consequences of 
contingent liabilities? From Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, the main cause of low economic 
growth in African states is the poor public institutions and the lack of clear policies on debt 
management. A pragmatic view is that once a country crosses a certain debt-to-GDP 
threshold, debt could easily become a dominant factor going forward as well as the biggest 
constraint on policies and growth; how it was accumulated becomes secondary and dealing 
with the indebtedness itself becomes a primary task and countries which chose to generate 
large primary surpluses in institutional reform.   
The following has also been learnt:  
Public debt can constrain growth in developing countries through three channels: 
1. Debt Overhang: In a highly indebted economy, since private investors expect that 
future output will in effect be taxed to repay the debt, the expected return to private 
investment is reduced; hence investment and growth fall. Private investment may also 
be discouraged by the macroeconomic uncertainty and unpredictable taxation 
engendered by high debt. And the incentives for governments to carry out policy 
reform may be lower since successful reforms would result in greater pressure to 
repay creditors. 
2. Fiscal Space: High debt service results in pressures on the government budget and 




3. Crowding Out: The financing of high fiscal deficits could raise real interest rates and 
dampen, or crowd out, private investment as lenders may prefer to hold relatively safe 
and high-yielding government paper. Where capital controls do not exist, private 
borrowers crowded out of the domestic market may tap the overseas market; but are 
unlikely to invest in real assets so long as government debt yields high returns.  
Based on the evidence available, public debt appears to be constraining growth in a 
number of prominent developing countries, most obviously in those that are 
experiencing debt sustainability problems. A debt sustainability problem means that 
the present combination of primary surpluses, real interest and growth rates is no 
longer tenable. It could also be a sign of solvency problems, i.e., that creditors believe 
that the present value of surpluses is less than the outstanding public debt. This in turn 
could mean that the country is not expected to grow out of its debt problem otherwise, 
there would not be a sustainability issue to begin with—and generate uncertainty 
about future inflation and taxation with harmful effects on investment . 
 
Further, any developing country which is debt intolerant and faces high spreads on its 
sovereign borrowing should also be regarded as being in a situation where public debt is 
constraining growth. Developing countries tend to be more volatile than their industrialized 
counterparts such as Japan and the United States. Catão and Kapur (2004) find that once the 
volatility of output or the terms of trade is included in logit regressions of default probability 
in a cross-country panel, the credit history variable of Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano 
(2003) is no longer significant. This means that credit history is to some extent a substitute 
for volatility, which translates into debt distress: a one percentage point increase in volatility 
in real GDP leads to a 12 percent decline in the sustainable debt threshold. Paradoxically, 
countries that most need debt finance for smoothing are the ones that can least tolerate it. 
This also raises the puzzle why countries and their creditors continue to underestimate the 
levels of volatility, or to overestimate their own capacity to service debt in its presence. 
 
Whilst debt levels are in some SADC countries such as Zambia and Mozambique are 
soaring, it is probably neither realistic nor desirable to hold off infrastructure investment until 
such reforms are adopted. For the evidence suggests that, in addition to providing immediate 
economic stimulus, public infrastructure investment has a significant, positive effect on 
output and growth. 
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In conclusion – the combination of a favourable global environment and improved domestic 
conditions offers the option of issuing sovereign bonds to first time issuers in sub-Saharan 
African countries. In many cases there will be a need for substantial capacity- building 
efforts. It is advisable then that sovereign issuances be carefully planned and prepared, and 
used as only one of a range of possible financing instruments. In particular, issuance of 
sovereign bonds should be one of several pillars of broadening government financing 
instruments, which should also include efforts to develop domestic debt markets and broaden 
options for infrastructure finance. Most importantly, African countries need to improve their 
public institutions and policies before any substantial inclusive economic growth can be 
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Table 5: Organised data for regression and panel data model 
Country Year IS Growth ExDebt Debt 
Angola 2004 4.9 11.2 36.2 54.1 
Angola 2005 5.5 20.6 15.9 44.8 
Angola 2006 13.0 20.7 7.9 21.6 
Angola 2007 14.4 22.6 6.5 21.4 
Angola 2008 23.3 13.8 5.8 31.6 
Angola 2009 12.4 2.4 8.3 36.5 
Angola 2010 9.7 3.4 8.7 37.6 
Angola 2011 8.6 3.9 7.5 31.5 
Angola 2012 9.4 8.4 7.1 29.3 
Angola 2013  6.2 9.4 32.8 
Angola 2014   7.3 11.4 34.7 
Botswana 2004 9.9 6 4.6 9.7 
Botswana 2005 7.6 1.6 3.8 7 
Botswana 2006 6.5 5.1 3.1 5.4 
Botswana 2007 7.0 4.8 2.6 7.1 
Botswana 2008 10.2 3 2.1 6.4 
Botswana 2009 16.4 -4.7 12 15.8 
Botswana 2010 13.3 7 13.1 17.6 
Botswana 2011 9.9 5.1 10.2 16.7 
Botswana 2012 8.2 3.8 9.6 14.9 
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Botswana 2013  6.4 8.8 13.4 
Botswana 2014   5.8 7.5 11.7 
Lesotho 2004 7.8 2.8 57.8 56.9 
Lesotho 2005 8.0 2.9 52.2 61.6 
Lesotho 2006 7.3 4.1 53.5 64.4 
Lesotho 2007 6.9 4.9 41.7 60.4 
Lesotho 2008 11.2 5.1 41 52.2 
Lesotho 2009 13.9 4.8 39.6 37.8 
Lesotho 2010 18.8 6.3 32.9 35.4 
Lesotho 2011 18.3 5.7 31.5 39.1 
Lesotho 2012 18.8 4 35.7 41.9 
Lesotho 2013  3.5 37.1 43.1 
Lesotho 2014   3.1 36.5 41.9 
Namibia 2004 3.3 12.3 5.1 27.5 
Namibia 2005 3.5 2.5 4.4 26 
Namibia 2006 2.7 7.1 4.5 23.8 
Namibia 2007 3.3 5.4 5.1 19.1 
Namibia 2008 3.6 3.4 4.3 17.7 
Namibia 2009 5.1 -1.1 4.9 16 
Namibia 2010 5.8 6.6 4.4 15.7 
Namibia 2011 6.7 4.8 6.2 23.5 
Namibia 2012 9.2 4 8.3 26.6 
Namibia 2013  4.2 7.9 31.9 
Namibia 2014   4 7.9 29.1 
Seychelles 2004 3.8 -2.9 33 163.2 
Seychelles 2005 5.0 9 35.3 144.1 
Seychelles 2006 7.2 9.4 22.2 132.5 
Seychelles 2007 5.4 10.1 24.8 130.7 
Seychelles 2008 2.0 -1.9 31.2 130 
Seychelles 2009 5.3 -0.2 29.8 123.5 
Seychelles 2010 8.6 5.6 24.7 81.6 
Seychelles 2011 8.1 5 24.6 74.3 
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Seychelles 2012 13.2 2.8 26.6 82.5 
Seychelles 2013  3.2 28.9 75.5 
Seychelles 2014   3.9 31.6 66.2 
South Africa 2004 1.1 4.6 2.3 35.9 
South Africa 2005 1.0 5.3 2 34.7 
South Africa 2006 1.2 5.6 1.9 32.6 
South Africa 2007 1.1 5.5 1.8 28.3 
South Africa 2008 1.2 3.6 1.9 27.8 
South Africa 2009 1.2 -1.5 1.9 31.3 
South Africa 2010 1.5 3.1 1.8 35.8 
South Africa 2011 1.9 3.5 2 39.8 
South Africa 2012 2.3 2.5 2.1 42.3 
South Africa 2013  2.8 2.2 42.7 
South Africa 2014   3.3 2.1 43.7 
Swaziland 2004 8.2 2.3   18.5 
Swaziland 2005 7.7 2.2  16.5 
Swaziland 2006 7.1 2.9  17.3 
Swaziland 2007 6.7 2.8  18.4 
Swaziland 2008 7.8 3.1  16.6 
Swaziland 2009 9.3 1.2  12.6 
Swaziland 2010 8.7 1.9  17.1 
Swaziland 2011 7.0 0.3  18.3 
Swaziland 2012 9.3 -1.5  19 
Swaziland 2013  0  20.9 
Swaziland 2014   0.3   35.1 
Zambia 2004 8.7 5.4 114.4 22 
Zambia 2005 7.1 5.3 57.5 19.4 
Zambia 2006 4.2 6.2 5 29.8 
Zambia 2007 4.2 6.2 10.3 26.7 
Zambia 2008 3.6 5.7 8.6 23.5 
Zambia 2009 3.5 6.4 12.3 26.9 
Zambia 2010 3.2 7.6 10.8 25.8 
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Zambia 2011 4.2 6.8 10.9 25.1 
Zambia 2012 5.4 7.3 13.9 26.9 
Zambia 2013  7.8 14.3 28.7 
Zambia 2014   8 14 29.7 
Malawi 2004 7.3 5.5 112.6 139.6 
Malawi 2005 7.7 2.6 107.2 141.2 
Malawi 2006 6.2 2.1 16.9 36.4 
Malawi 2007 10.5 9.5 15.8 35.4 
Malawi 2008 10.7 8.3 16.6 44.6 
Malawi 2009 6.7 9 15.9 43.4 
Malawi 2010 7.7 6.5 16 37.4 
Malawi 2011 8.0 4.3 16.2 42.1 
Malawi 2012 6.8 1.9 22.8 54.9 
Malawi 2013  5.5 26.2 50.5 
Malawi 2014   6.1 24.3 43.1 
Mozambique 2004 10.0 7.9 77.5 70.7 
Mozambique 2005 10.6 8.4 70.7 81 
Mozambique 2006 10.5 8.7 45.5 53.6 
Mozambique 2007 16.1 7.3 40.8 41.9 
Mozambique 2008 18.3 6.8 36.6 42.1 
Mozambique 2009 12.9 6.3 41.6 51.9 
Mozambique 2010 13.9 7.1 42.3 49.3 
Mozambique 2011 13.9 7.3 35.5 45.1 
Mozambique 2012 14.8 7.5 32.8 46.6 
Mozambique 2013  8.4 33.7 47 
Mozambique 2014   8 34.6 47.6 
Tanzania 2004 5.3 7.8 52.8 56.3 
Tanzania 2005 7.8 7.4 43.6 56 
Tanzania 2006 7.5 6.7 31 42.6 
Tanzania 2007 6.4 7.1 18.5 28.4 
Tanzania 2008 7.3 7.4 19.1 29.2 
Tanzania 2009 7.6 6 22.2 32.6 
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Tanzania 2010 8.1 7 24.7 37.7 
Tanzania 2011 7.4 6.4 27 40 
Tanzania 2012 8.7 6.9 24.7 41.4 
Tanzania 2013  7 23.5 44.9 
Tanzania 2014   7.2 22.9 46.4 
DRC 2004 2.8 6.6 167.9 196 
DRC 2005 3.3 7.8 156.8 147.9 
DRC 2006 3.2 5.6 134.2 149 
DRC 2007 2.3 6.3 125.7 126.1 
DRC 2008 3.7 6.2 114.2 133.1 
DRC 2009 7.8 2.8 117.2 136.3 
DRC 2010 14.1 7.2 23.3 38.4 
DRC 2011 19.5 6.9 20.3 33 
DRC 2012 21.7 7.1 21 36 
DRC 2013  8.3 21.5 41.3 
DRC 2014   6.4 22 46.2 
Zimbabwe 2004 5.1 -6.1 62.7   
Zimbabwe 2005 1.9 -5.6 57.5 49.5 
Zimbabwe 2006 2.0 -3.4 69 58.4 
Zimbabwe 2007 1.2 -3.7 76.9 66.2 
Zimbabwe 2008 0.3 -17.8 94.4 92.2 
Zimbabwe 2009 0.8 8.9 88.2 90.7 
Zimbabwe 2010 7.7 9.6 78.9 77.6 
Zimbabwe 2011 5.2 10.6 65.2 65.3 
Zimbabwe 2012 5.8 4.4 60 60.5 
Zimbabwe 2013  5 56.1 56.1 
Zimbabwe 2014   5.7 51.7 49.7 
Mauritius 2004 3.9 4.3 7.5 56.9 
Mauritius 2005 3.3 1.5 7.3 61.6 
Mauritius 2006 3.3 4.5 6.8 64.4 
Mauritius 2007 2.9 5.9 6 60.4 
Mauritius 2008 4.3 5.5 5.5 52.2 
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Mauritius 2009 2.0 3 7.4 37.8 
Mauritius 2010 2.7 4.1 8.4 35.4 
Mauritius 2011 2.7 3.8 8.4 39.1 
Mauritius 2012 2.5 3.3 8.9 41.9 
Mauritius 2013  3.7 10.2 43.1 
Mauritius 2014   4.4 12.1 41.9 
Madagscar 2004 12.5 5.3 78.4 90.9 
Madagscar 2005 9.9 4.6 66.5 82.2 
Madagascar 2006 10.3 5 28.8 37 
Madagascar 2007 7.6 6.2 26 33.5 
Madagascar 2008 8.6 7.1 23.4 31.9 
Madagascar 2009 4.9 -4.1 29.4 36 
Madagascar 2010 5.0 0.4 28.7 36.1 
Madagascar 2011 4.2 1.8 25.9 37.4 
Madagascar 2012 3.5 1.9 25.8 38.3 
Madagascar 2013  2.6 25 37.5 
Madagascar 2014   3.8 24.3 39.3 



















Table 6: Total public debt as a percentage of GDP in SADC (2004- 2012) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014(e) 
Angola 54.1 44.8 21.6 21.4 31.6 36.5 37.6 31.5 29.3 32.8 34.7 
Botswana 9.7 7 5.4 7.1 6.4 15.8 17.6 16.7 14.9 11.7 11.18 
Lesotho 56.9 61.6 64.4 60.4 52.2 37.8 35.4 39.1 41.9 43.1 41.9 
Namibia 27.5 26 23.8 19.1 17.7 16 15.7 23.5 26.6 31.9 29.1 
Seychelles 163.2 144.1 132.5 130.7 130 123.5 81.6 74.3 82.5 75.5 66.2 
South Africa 35.9 34.7 32.6 28.3 27.8 31.3 35.8 39.8 42.3 42.7 43.7 
Zambia 22 19.4 29.8 26.7 23.5 26.9 25.8 25.1 26.9 28.7 29.7 
Malawi 139.6 141.2 36.4 35.4 44.6 43.4 37.4 42.1 54.9 50.5 43.1 
Mozambique 70.7 81 53.6 41.9 42.1 51.9 49.3 45.1 46.6 47 47.6 
Tanzania 56.3 56 42.6 28.4 29.2 32.6 37.7 40 41.4 44.9 46.4 
DRC 196 147.9 149 126.1 133.1 136.3 38.4 33 36 41.3 46.2 
Zimbabwe  49.5 58.4 66.2 92.2 90.7 77.6 65.3 60.5 56.1 49.7 
Mauritius 56.9 61.6 64.4 60.4 52.2 27.8 35.4 39.1 41.9 43.1 41.9 
Madagascar 90.9 82.2 37 33.5 31.9 36 36.1 37.4 38.3 37.5 39.3 
Swaziland 18.5 16.5 17.3 18.4 16.6 12.6 17.1 18.3 19 20.9 35.1 
Source: IMF Regional Economic Outlook, May 2013 
Table 7: External debt to official creditors as a percentage of GDP in SADC (2004 -2012) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014(e) 
Angola 36.2 15.9 7.9 6.5 5.8 8.3 8.7 7.5 7.1 9.4 11.4 
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Botswana 4.6 3.6 3.1 2.6 2.1 12 13.1 10.2 9.6 8.8 7.5 
Lesotho 57.8 52.2 53.5 41.7 41 39.6 32.9 31.5 35.7 37.1 36.5 
Namibia 5.1 4.4 4.5 5.1 4.3 4.9 4.4 6.2 8.3 7.9 7.9 
Seychelles 33 35.3 22.2 24.8 31.2 29.8 24.7 24.6 26.6 28.9 31.6 
South Africa 2.3 2 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 2 2.1 2.2 2.1 
Zambia 114.4 57.5 5 10.3 8.6 12.3 10.8 10.9 13.9 14.3 14 
Malawi 112.6 107.2 16.9 15.8 16.6 15.9 16 16.2 22.8 26.2 24.3 
Mozambique 77.5 70.7 45.5 40.8 36.6 41.6 42.3 35.5 32.8 33.7 34.6 
Tanzania 52.8 43.6 31 18.5 19.1 22.2 24.7 27 24.7 23.5 22.9 
DRC 167.9 156.8 134.2 125.7 114.2 117.2 23.3 20.3 21 21.5 22 
Zimbabwe 62.7 57.5 69 76.9 94.4 88.2 78.9 65.2 60 56.1 51.7 
Mauritius 7.5 7.3 6.8 6 5.5 7.4 8.4 8.4 8.9 10.2 12.1 
Madagascar 78.4 66.5 28.8 26 23.4 29.4 28.7 25.9 25.8 25 24.3 
Swaziland - - - - - - - - - - - 
Source: IMF Regional Economic Outlook, May 2013 
 
Table 8: Capital expenditure/ Infrastructure spend as a percentage of GDP in SADC (2004- 2012) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Angola 4.9 5.5 13 14.4 23.3 12.4 9.7 8.6 9.4 
Botswana 9.9 7.6 6.5 7 10.2 16.4 13.3 9.9 8.2 
Lesotho 7.8 8 7.3 6.9 11.2 13.9 18.8 18.3 18.8 
Namibia 3.3 3.5 2.7 3.3 3.6 5.1 5.8 6.7 9.2 
Seychelles 3.8 5 7.2 5.4 2 5.3 8.6 8.1 13.2 
South Africa 1.1 1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.3 
Zambia 8.7 7.1 4.2 4.2 3.6 3.5 3.2 4.2 5.4 
Malawi 7.3 7.7 6.2 10.5 10.7 6.7 7.7 8 6.8 
Mozambique 10 10.6 10.5 16.1 18.3 12.9 13.9 13.9 14.8 
Tanzania 5.3 7.8 7.5 6.4 7.3 7.6 8.1 7.4 8.7 
DRC 2.8 3.3 3.2 2.3 3.7 7.8 14.1 19.5 21.7 
Zimbabwe 5.1 1.9 2 1.2 0.3 0.8 7.7 5.2 5.8 
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Mauritius 3.9 3.3 3.3 2.9 4.3 2 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Madagascar 12.5 9.9 10.3 7.6 8.6 4.9 5 4.2 3.5 
Swaziland 8.2 7.7 7.1 6.7 7.8 9.3 8.7 7 9.3 
Source: African Development Bank, Statistics Department  
 
 
Table 9: GDP growth in SADC (2004- 2014) 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014(e) 
Angola 11.2 20.6 20.7 22.6 13.8 2.4 3.4 3.9 8.4 6.2 7.3 
Botswana 6 1.6 5.1 4.8 3 -4.7 7 5.1 3.8 6.4 5.8 
Lesotho 2.8 2.9 4.1 4.9 5.1 4.8 6.3 5.7 4 3.5 3.1 
Namibia 12.3 2.5 7.1 5.4 3.4 -1.1 6.6 4.8 4 4.2 4 
Seychelles -2.9 9 9.4 10.1 -1.9 -0.2 5.6 5 2.8 3.2 3.9 
South Africa 4.6 5.3 5.6 5.5 3.6 -1.5 3.1 3.5 2.5 2.8 3.3 
Zambia 5.4 5.3 6.2 6.2 5.7 6.4 7.6 6.8 7.3 7.8 8 
Malawi 5.5 2.6 2.1 9.5 8.3 9 6.5 4.3 1.9 5.5 6.1 
Mozambique 7.9 8.4 8.7 7.3 6.8 6.3 7.1 7.3 7.5 8.4 8 
Tanzania 7.8 7.4 6.7 7.1 7.4 6 7 6.4 6.9 7 7.2 
DRC 6.6 7.8 5.6 6.3 6.2 2.8 7.2 6.9 7.1 8.3 6.4 
Zimbabwe -6.1 -5.6 -3.4 -3.7 -17.8 8.9 9.6 10.6 4.4 5 5.7 
Mauritius 4.3 1.5 4.5 5.9 5.5 3 4.1 3.8 3.3 3.7 4.4 
Madagascar 5.3 4.6 5 6.2 7.1 -4.1 0.4 1.8 1.9 2.6 3.8 
Swaziland 2.3 2.2 2.9 2.8 3.1 1.2 1.9 0.3 -1.5 0 3 





Table 6: Tax Revenue as a percentage of GDP, excluding grants (2004 -2014) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014(e) 
Angola 36.7 43.9 50.2 45.8 50.9 34.5 43.5 48.8 44.5 40.4 38 
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Botswana 36.3 39.7 38.6 34 30.4 32.4 29.1 28.8 29.2 28.4 28.2 
Lesotho 50.9 51.3 65.1 61.5 64.9 60.7 45.4 44.8 59.1 56.2 53.3 
Namibia 25.1 26.2 28.4 30.3 30.9 30.9 28.1 30.1 33.6 31.2 30.9 
Seychelles 40.3 39.2 39.7 31.7 31.4 32.9 34.1 35.8 37.3 36.6 35.9 
South Africa 25.3 26.9 26.9 29.2 29.8 27.4 27.3 28.1 27.9 27.8 27.9 
Zambia 18.2 17.6 17.2 18.4 18.9 16 17.8 20.9 19.8 20.4 20.4 
Malawi 18.8 21.5 20.7 21.3 22.5 24 27.5 25 26 27.1 27.2 
Mozambique 13.1 14.1 15 15.9 15.9 17.6 20.5 22.2 23.9 23.1 23.3 
Tanzania 11.4 12.2 13.6 15.2 16 16.1 16.3 17.3 17.8 18.1 18.3 
DRC 9.5 11.4 12.8 14.7 18.5 16.8 18.9 18.8 22.2 22.4 23.1 
Zimbabwe  15.3 9.3 3.8 2.9 15.2 29.6 32.9 35.7 35.2 35.1 
Mauritius 19 19.4 18.9 19.4 20.5 21.2 21.2 20.7 20.7 21.3 20.8 
Madagascar 12 10.9 11.2 11.7 11.7 13.3 11.1 11.3 11 11.4 11.4 
Swaziland 31.4 32.2 41.9 36.9 39.8 35.4 24.6 25.4 37.9 35.8 25.9 
Source: IMF Regional Economic Outlook, May 2013 
 
Sample of SADC countries sovereign bond issuances 



















Seychelles 9/27/2006 9.466 5 470 200 B USD England Bullet Funged 
Namibia 10/27/2011 5.835 10 336 500 Not 
rated 
USD England Bullet Fixed 
Zambia 9/13/2012 5.625 10 384 750 B+ USD England Bullet Fixed 
Tanzania 2/27/2013  7 600 600 Not 
rated 
USD England Bullet Floating 
Source: IMF Regional Economic Outlook, May 2013 
 
 
65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
 
 
